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1. Introduction
In the past ten years, I have argued repeatedly that a
coherent international tax regime exists, embodied both
in the tax treaty network and in domestic laws, and that
it forms a significant part of international law (both
treaty-based and customary). The practical implication
is that countries are not free to adopt any international
tax rules they please, but rather operate in the context of
the regime, which changes in the same ways international law changes over time. Thus, unilateral action is
possible, but is also restricted, and countries are generally reluctant to take unilateral actions that violate the
basic norms that underlie the regime. Those norms are
the single tax principle (i.e. that income should be taxed
once – not more and not less) and the benefits principle
(i.e. that active business income should be taxed primarily at source and passive investment income primarily
at residence).
This thesis is quite controversial. Several prominent
international tax academics and practitioners in the
United States (e.g. Michael Graetz, David Rosenbloom,
Julie Roin and Mitchell Kane) and elsewhere (e.g. Tsilly
Dagan) have advocated the view that there is no international tax regime and that countries are free to adopt any
tax rules they believe further their own interests. 1 Other
prominent tax academics (e.g. Hugh Ault, Yariv Brauner,
Paul McDaniel, Diane Ring and Richard Vann) and
practitioners (e.g. Luca dell’Anese, Shay Menuchin and
Philip West) have supported the view advocated above.2
There is, however, no coherent exposition of this view in
the academic or practical literature. This article is
intended to fill this gap, following up on previous articles
in which I developed the above thesis.3
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The article is divided into four parts. The first part
argues that an international tax regime exists, embodied
both in the tax treaty network and in the domestic tax
laws of the major trading nations. Illustrations are provided from recent developments that show countries
like the United States and Germany complying with the
basic norms of the regime, such as non-discrimination.
The second part argues that the international tax regime
is an important part of international law as it evolved in
the 20th century. In particular, the article argues that
parts of international tax law can be seen as customary
international law and therefore as binding even in the
absence of treaties. An example is the arm’s length standard under transfer pricing. The third part of the article
explains the basic structure of the international tax
regime and its underlying norms, the single tax principle
and the benefits principle. The third part also sets out
the normative rationale for these norms. The fourth part
discusses recent challenges to the international tax
regime, such as tax competition and tax arbitrage, and
argues that the reaction to these challenges by the
OECD, the WTO, the European Union and specific tax
administrations proves the existence of the international
tax regime.

* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LLM,
the University of Michigan.
1. Graetz, Michael J., “Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies”, 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1357 (2001); Rosenbloom, H. David, “Cross-Border Arbitrage:
The Good, The Bad and The Ugly” (forthcoming in Taxes (University of
Chicago publication), 2006); Rosenbloom, H. David, “International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax System’”, 53 Tax Law Review 137 (2000); Roin,
Julie, “Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax
Competition”, 89 Georgetown Law Journal 543 (2001); Dagan, Tsilly, “The Tax
Treaties Myth”, 32 NYU Journal of International Law and Policy 939 (2000);
Kane, Mitchell A., “Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage”, 53 Emory Law Journal 89 (2005).
2. Dell’Anese, Luca, Tax Arbitrage and the Changing Structure of International Tax Law (2006); Ring, Diane M., “One Nation Among Many: Policy
Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage”, 44 Boston College Law Review 79
(2005); Menuchin, Shay N., The Dilemma of International Tax Arbitrage
(2004); Ault, Hugh J., “The Importance of International Cooperation in
Forging Tax Policy”, 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1693 (2001);
McDaniel, Paul R., “Trade and Taxation”, 26 Brooklyn Journal of International
Law 1621 (2001); Vann, Richard J., “International Aspects of Income Tax”, in
Thuronyi, Victor (ed.), 2 Tax Law Design and Drafting 718 (2000); West, Philip
R., “Foreign Law in U.S. International Taxation”, 3 Florida Tax Review 147
(1996).
3. See e.g. Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “The Structure of International Taxation:
A Proposal for Simplification”, 74 Texas Law Review 1301 (1996); Avi-Yonah,
Reuven S., “International Taxation of Electronic Commerce”, 52 Tax Law
Review 507 (1997); and Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State”, 113 Harvard Law Review 1573
(2000).
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2. Is There an International Tax Regime?4
The most important statement denying the existence of
the international tax regime is the 1998 Tillinghast Lecture delivered by H. David Rosenbloom at New York
University Law School.5 He began his lecture by quoting
from the legislative history of the US dual consolidated
loss rule a statement referring to an “international tax
system”. He then proceeded to deny the existence of this
system or regime (“that system appears to be imaginary”) because, in the real world, only the different tax
laws of various countries exist, and those laws vary
greatly from each other.
Of course, this description is true as far as it goes, but is
this the whole truth? As Rosenbloom noted, in fact, there
has been a remarkable degree of convergence even in the
purely domestic tax laws of developed countries. Not
only can tax lawyers talk to each other across national
boundaries and understand what each is saying (the terminology is the same), but the need to face similar problems in taxing income has also led jurisdictions with different starting points to reach quite similar results. For
example, countries that started off with a global tax system (i.e. tax all income from whatever source derived in
the same way) have now incorporated schedular elements (for example, the capital loss and passive activity
loss rules in the United States), whereas countries with a
schedular background (i.e. tax different types of income
differently) have largely adopted schedules for “other
income” that lead to a global tax base (for example, the
United Kingdom).
Not surprisingly, this convergence is most advanced in
international tax matters because, in this case, the tax
laws of various jurisdictions actually interact with each
other and one can document cases of direct influence.
For example, every developed country now tends to tax
currently passive income derived by its residents overseas (through controlled foreign corporation (CFC) and
foreign investment funds (FIF) rules, which were
inspired by the US example) and to exempt or defer
active business income. Thus, the distinction between
countries that assert worldwide taxing jurisdiction and
those that only tax territorially has lost much of its force.
Other examples of such convergence are developed in
the course of this article.
The claim that an international tax regime exists, however, rests mainly on the bilateral tax treaty network,
which, as Rosenbloom stated, is “a triumph of international law”. The treaties are, of course, remarkably similar
(even as to the order of the articles), being based on the
same OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions. In most
countries, the treaties have a higher status than domestic
law and thus constrain domestic tax jurisdiction; and
even in the United States, the treaties typically override
contrary domestic law. This means that, in international
tax matters, countries typically are bound by treaty to
behave in certain ways (for example, not tax a foreign
seller who has no permanent establishment) and cannot
enact legislation to the contrary.

© IBFD

I would argue that the network of 2,000 or more bilateral
tax treaties that are largely similar in policy, and even in
language, constitutes an international tax regime which
has definable principles that underlie it and are common
to the treaties. These principles are the single tax principle and the benefits principle, which are articulated further below. In brief, the single tax principle states that
income from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once (that is, not more, but also not less, than
once) at the rate determined by the benefits principle.
The benefits principle allocates the right to tax active
business income primarily to the source jurisdiction and
the right to tax passive investment income primarily to
the residence jurisdiction.
To those who doubt the existence of the international
tax regime, let me pose the following question. If you
were advising a developing country or transition economy that wanted to adopt an income tax for the first
time, how free do you think you would be to write the
international tax rules for such a country in any way you
wanted, assuming that it wished to attract foreign investment? I would argue that the freedom of most countries
to adopt international tax rules is severely constrained,
even before entering into any tax treaties, by the need to
adapt to generally accepted principles of international
taxation. Even if divergent rules have been adopted, the
process of integration into the world economy forces
change. For example, Mexico had to abandon its long
tradition of applying formulas in transfer pricing and
adopt rules modelled after the OECD guidelines in
order to be able to join the OECD. South Korea similarly
had to change its broad interpretation of what constitutes a permanent establishment under pressure from
the OECD. And Bolivia had to abandon its attempt to
adopt a cash-flow corporate tax because the tax was
ruled not creditable in the United States. Even the
United States is not immune to this type of pressure to
conform, as can be seen from comparing the 1993 proposed transfer pricing regulations under US Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) Sec. 482, which led to an international uproar, with the final regulations, which reflect
the OECD guidelines.
Another illustration can be derived from recent developments in both the US and Germany regarding the
application of the non-discrimination principle, which
is embodied in all tax treaties, to thin capitalization rules
that are designed to prevent foreign taxpayers from
eliminating the corporate tax base through capitalizing
domestic subsidiary corporations principally with debt.
When the US first adopted its thin capitalization rule in
1989, the US carefully applied it to both foreigners and
domestic tax exempts so as not to appear to be denying
interest deductions only to foreigners. The US did this
even though thin capitalization rules are an accepted

4. This part is based on Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State”, supra note 3.
5. Rosenbloom, “International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax
System’”, supra note 1.
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part of international tax law and even though its constitutional law permits unilateral overrides of tax treaties.
The Germans adopted the same rule, but when it was
nevertheless struck down as discriminatory by the European Court of Justice in 2002, they responded by applying the thin capitalization rule to all domestic as well as
foreign taxpayers. Neither the US nor the German
actions are understandable in the absence of an international tax regime embodying the non-discrimination
principle.
3. Is the International Tax Regime Part of
International Law?6
Few would dispute that the network of bilateral tax
treaties forms an important part of international law.
Thus, the key issue is whether these treaties and the
domestic tax laws of various jurisdictions can be said to
form an international tax regime that is part of customary international law.
Customary international law is law that “results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation”.7 “International
agreements create law for states parties thereto and may
lead to the creation of customary international law when
such agreements are intended for adherence by states
generally and are in fact widely accepted.”8
There are clearly international tax practices that are
widely followed, such as, for example, avoiding double
taxation by granting an exemption for foreign-source
income or a credit for foreign taxes. Moreover, there are
over 2,000 bilateral tax treaties in existence, and they all
follow one of two widely accepted models (the OECD
and UN Models), which themselves are quite similar to
each other and are “intended for adherence by states
generally”. Is this enough to create a customary international tax law?
The discussion below briefly surveys some examples
that, in my opinion, strengthen the view that the international tax regime rises to the level of customary international law. As usual, the hard question is whether countries not only follow a rule, but do so out of a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris).
3.1. Jurisdiction to tax
Can a country simply decide to tax non-residents that
have no connection to it on foreign-source income? The
answer is clearly no, both from a practical perspective
and, I would argue, from a customary international law
perspective. The fact that this rule is followed from a
sense of legal obligation is illustrated by the behaviour of
the US in adopting the FPHC (foreign personal holding
company) and CFC rules. In the case of corporations
controlled by US residents, the US does not tax those
corporations directly, but rather taxes the US resident
shareholders on imaginary (deemed) dividends distributed to the shareholders. This deemed dividend rule was
adopted precisely because the US felt bound by a customary international law rule not to tax non-residents
132

BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION APRIL 2007

directly on foreign-source income, even though they are
controlled by residents. The US no longer feels bound by
this rule, but that is because enough other countries have
adopted CFC legislation which expands the definition
of nationality that customary international law has
changed. The spread of CFC legislation from 1962
onward is a good example of how rapidly customary
international law can in fact change.
3.2. Non-discrimination
The non-discrimination norm (i.e. that non-residents
from a treaty country should not be treated worse than
residents) is embodied in all tax treaties. But is it part of
customary international law? The behaviour of the US
in the earnings-stripping (thin capitalization) episode
described above suggests that the US felt at the time that
the non-discrimination norm was binding even outside
the treaty context. Otherwise, even if the US did not
wish to override treaties, it could have applied a different
rule to non-treaty country residents (as it did in the
branch profits tax context three years earlier). Thus, I
would argue that the non-discrimination norm may in
fact be part of customary international law even in the
absence of a treaty.
3.3. The arm’s length standard
The standard applied in all tax treaties to the transfer
pricing problem of determining the proper allocation of
profits between related entities is the “arm’s length standard”, which means that transactions between related
parties may be adjusted by the tax authorities to the
terms that would have been negotiated had the parties
been unrelated to each other. This standard has been the
governing rule since the 1930s.
In the 1980s, the US realized that in many circumstances
it is very difficult to find comparable transactions
between unrelated parties on which to base the arm’s
length determination. The US therefore began the
process of revising the regulations that govern transfer
pricing. This culminated in 1995 with the adoption of
two new methods, the comparable profit method and
profit split method, that rely much less on finding comparables (and, in the case of profit split, sometimes
require no comparables at all).
What is remarkable about the process by which these
regulations were adopted is the US’s insistence throughout that what it was doing was consistent with the arm’s
length standard. The US even initially called profit split
the “basic arm’s length return method”. But as I have
pointed out elsewhere, once you abandon the search for
comparables, it is meaningless to call a method “arm’s

6. This part is based on Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “International Tax as International Law”, 57 Tax Law Review 483 (2004).
7. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), Sec. 102(2).
8. Id., Sec. 102(3).

© IBFD

Articles

length” because, without comparables, nobody can know
what unrelated parties would have done.9
Nevertheless, despite initial objections, the OECD ultimately came to accept the gist of the new methods in its
revised transfer pricing guidelines, which were issued a
short time after the new US regulations and represent
the widely followed consensus view of transfer pricing.
The new methods are thus accepted under the rubric of
“arm’s length”.
As Brian Lepard has suggested, the US’s insistence that it
was following the arm’s length standard indicates that it
felt that the standard is part of customary international
law.10 Such a finding has important implications because
the US states explicitly follow a non-arm’s length
method, formulary apportionment, which has been
twice upheld by the US Supreme Court. If the arm’s
length method is customary international law, the US
Supreme Court cases may have been wrongly decided, as
customary international law is part of federal law and
arguably pre-empts contrary state law.
3.4. Foreign tax credits versus deductions
Many economists argue that countries should give only
a deduction for foreign taxes rather than a credit. However, countries generally grant either an exemption for
foreign-source income or a credit for foreign taxes paid.
Remarkably, in most cases (following the lead of the US),
this is done even in the absence of a treaty. It is likely that,
at this point, countries consider themselves in practice
bound by the credit or exemption norm, and a country
would be highly reluctant to switch to a deduction
method instead. Thus, arguably, preventing double taxation through a credit or exemption has become part of
customary international law.
3.5. Concluding remarks
If customary international tax law exists, this has important implications for the US and other countries. As Justice Gray wrote over 100 years ago in the Paquete
Habana case:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction
as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is
no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations. (175 U.S. 677 (1900), at 700)

To the extent legislation exists, it can in the US override
customary international law as well as treaties. But in the
absence of treaties or legislation, resort can be had to
customary international law; and I would argue that it
can also be used to ascertain the underlying purposes of
treaties.
To the extent customary international tax law exists, this
suggests that it is a mistake to deny the existence of an
international tax system or regime. Admittedly, even if
an international tax regime exists, we do not know what
we should do about it – this has to be investigated in
each particular case. But we should not pretend that
© IBFD

there are no binding, widely accepted international tax
norms that we should flout only when significant
national interests are at stake. This view has important
implications whenever differences between countries’
domestic laws lead to the possibility of tax arbitrage,
which is discussed further below.
4. The Structure of the International Tax
Regime11
If an international tax regime exists, what does it look
like? The following sections define the two basic principles which, in my view, underlie the international tax
regime and discuss why they are normatively justified.
4.1. Defining the tax base: the single tax principle
International income taxation involves two basic questions:
(1) What is the appropriate level of taxation for income
from cross-border transactions?
(2) How are the resulting revenues to be divided among
the taxing jurisdictions?
The answer to the first question is the single tax principle: income from cross-border transactions should be
subject to tax once (that is, neither more nor less than
once). The single tax principle thus incorporates the traditional goal of avoiding double taxation, which was the
main motive for setting up the international tax regime
in the 1920s and 1930s. Taxing cross-border income
once also means, however, that it should not be undertaxed or (at the extreme) be subject to no tax at all.
The appropriate rate of tax for purposes of the single tax
principle is determined by the second principle of international taxation, the benefits principle. The benefits
principle, discussed below, assigns the primary right to
tax active business income to source jurisdictions and
the primary right to tax passive income to residence
jurisdictions. Therefore, the rate of tax for purposes of
the single tax principle is generally the source rate for
active business income and the residence rate for passive
(investment) income. When the primary jurisdiction
refrains from taxation, however, residual taxation by
other (residence or source) jurisdictions is possible and
may be necessary to prevent undertaxation. Such residual taxation means that all income from cross-border
transactions, under the single tax principle, should be
taxed at least at the source rate (which tends to be lower
than the residence rate), but at no more than the residence rate.
What is the normative basis for the single tax principle?
As an initial matter, I assume that most countries would
like to maintain both a personal income tax and a corporate income tax. The reasons for having both a personal
9. Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation”, 15 Virginia Tax Review 89 (1995).
10. Lepard, Brian D., “Is the United States Obligated to Drive on the
Right”, 10 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 43 (1999).
11. This part is based on Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “International Taxation of
Electronic Commerce”, supra note 3.
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income tax and a corporate income tax have been discussed extensively elsewhere and are not repeated here.12
For purposes of justifying the single tax principle, it is
sufficient that most countries in fact maintain their
existing personal and corporate income taxes.
Given a preference for imposing both a personal income
tax and a corporate income tax on the domestically
derived income of individuals and corporations, it
becomes relatively easy to establish why the single tax
principle is justified as a goal of the international tax
regime, on both theoretical and practical grounds. From
a theoretical perspective, if income derived from crossborder transactions is taxed more heavily than domestic
income, the added tax burden creates an inefficient
incentive to invest domestically. This proposition is
widely accepted and underlies the effort, which by now
is about a century old, to prevent or alleviate international multiple taxation.
The corollary also holds true: if income from cross-border transactions is taxed less heavily than domestic
income, this creates an inefficient incentive to invest
internationally rather than at home. The deadweight loss
from undertaxation is the same as that from overtaxation.
In addition, there is a strong equity argument against the
undertaxation of cross-border income, which applies to
income earned by individuals. From an equity perspective, the undertaxation of cross-border income violates
both horizontal and vertical equity when compared to
higher tax rates imposed on domestic-source income,
and in particular on domestic labour income. In this
case, the argument that equity violations tend to turn
into efficiency issues does not hold because labour is less
mobile than capital and wage earners typically do not
have the ability to transform their domestic wages into
foreign-source income.
On a practical level, the single tax principle can be justified because double taxation leads to tax rates that can
be extremely high and tend to stifle international investment. Zero taxation, on the other hand, offers an opportunity to avoid domestic taxation by investing abroad,
and therefore threatens to erode the national tax base.
T.S. Adams, the architect of the foreign tax credit and a
major influence in shaping the international tax regime,
recognized both of these propositions in the 1920s. In
justifying the foreign tax credit, Adams wrote that “the
state which with a fine regard for the rights of the taxpayer takes pains to relieve double taxation, may fairly
take measures to ensure that the person or property pays
at least one tax”. Contrary to an exemption system,
Adams’s credit operated to eliminate double taxation by
both source and residence jurisdictions, but preserved
residual residence-based taxation to enforce the single
tax principle.13
The practical justification for the single tax principle can
be seen most easily if one imagines a world with only
two countries, A and B, and only two companies, X (a
resident of A) and Y (a resident of B). If both A and B tax
134
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the foreign-source income of their residents and the
domestic-source income of foreigners, and neither gives
relief from double taxation, then both X and Y would
minimize their taxes by deriving only domestic-source
income (since any foreign tax would by definition be an
added burden). The result would be adequate revenues
collected by both A and B, but no cross-border trade or
investment.
On the other hand, suppose both A and B exempted
from tax the foreign-source income as well as the
domestic-source income of foreigners (a not inconceivable proposition in many developing countries, which
tax residents territorially and grant tax holidays to foreign investors). In that case, the way for both X and Y to
minimize their taxes would be to derive their entire
income from cross-border transactions. The result
would be adequate cross-border trade, but no revenues
for A or B. In a world in which international trade and
investment are important, but taxes (unlike tariffs) cannot be reduced to zero, the single tax principle is the best
option.
4.2. Dividing the tax base: the benefits principle
Having defined one goal of the international tax regime
as taxing cross-border income once, the next question is
how to divide that base among the various jurisdictions
laying claim to it. The benefits principle states that the
residence jurisdiction has the primary right to tax passive (investment) income, while the source jurisdiction
has the primary right to tax active (business) income. As
explained above, this division also determines the
appropriate rate of tax for purposes of the single tax
principle.
This distinction, which stems from the work of the
League of Nations in the 1920s, can also be justified on
both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. On a theoretical level, the benefits principle makes sense because it is
primarily individuals who derive investment income,
whereas it is primarily corporations that derive business
income. For individuals, residence-based taxation
makes sense. First, residence is relatively easy to determine in the case of individuals. Second, because most
individuals are part of only one society, distributive concerns can be addressed most effectively in the country of
residence. Third, residence overlaps with political allegiance and, in democratic countries, residence-based
taxation is a proxy for taxation with representation.
In the case of multinational corporations, source-based
taxation seems generally preferable. First, the grounds
for taxing individuals on a residence basis do not apply
to corporations. The residence of corporations is diffi-

12. See e.g. Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and
Progressive Taxation (Review of Slemrod, Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic
Consequences of Taxing the Rich)”, 111 Yale Law Journal 1391 (2002); and
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax”, 90 Virginia Law Review 1193 (2004).
13. Graetz, Michael J. and Michael M. O’Hear, “The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S.
International Taxation”, 46 Duke Law Journal 1021 (1997).
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cult to establish and relatively meaningless. Residence
based on the place of incorporation is formalistic and
subject to the taxpayer’s control, while residence based
on management and control can also be manipulated.
Moreover, multinationals are not part of a single society,
and their income does not belong to any particular society for distributive purposes. Finally, multinationals can
exert significant political influence in jurisdictions other
than the residence jurisdiction of their parent company;
therefore, the concern about taxing foreigners who lack
the ability to vote is less applicable to multinationals.
Second, source-based taxation is consistent with a benefits perspective on justifying tax jurisdiction. Source
jurisdictions provide significant benefits to corporations that carry on business activities within them. Such
benefits include the provision of infrastructure or education, as well as more specific government policies such
as keeping the exchange rate stable or interest rates low.
These benefits justify source-based corporate taxation
in the sense that the host country’s government bears
some of the costs of providing the benefits that are necessary for earning the income. As T.S. Adams wrote in
1917: “A large part of the cost of government is traceable
to the necessity of maintaining a suitable business environment.” These costs justify imposing a tax as compensation to the government bearing them.
On a more pragmatic level, as Adams also observed,
since the source jurisdiction has by definition the “first
bite at the apple”, that is, it has the first opportunity to
collect the tax on payments derived from within its borders, it would be extremely difficult to prevent source
jurisdictions from imposing the tax. “Every state insists
upon taxing the non-resident alien who derives income
from source [sic] within that country, and rightly so, at
least inevitably so.” Thus, as Michael Graetz and Michael
O’Hear observed, even if economists tend to prefer pure
residence-based taxation, this recommendation is
unlikely to be followed in practice.14 This is particularly
the case for business income derived from large markets,
where there is little fear that the foreign investor will
abandon the market because of source-based taxation.
For portfolio investment, however, even large source
countries like the United States have tended to abandon
source-based taxation for fear of driving away mobile
capital. Thus, business income is a better candidate for
source-based taxation than investment income.
The division between active (mostly corporate) and passive (mostly individual) income also makes sense
because it is congruent with the single tax principle since
most of the rate divergence among taxing jurisdictions
arises in the individual income tax, while corporate tax
rates have tended to converge. The top marginal personal income tax rate among the OECD Member countries varied in 2006 from 7.5% (Switzerland) to 53.8%
(Germany). This variability is acceptable for purposes of
the single tax principle because, under the benefits principle, most income derived by individuals in cross-border transactions is investment income that generally is
subject only to residence-country tax. Therefore, the res© IBFD

idence-country rate typically determines the single tax
rate for investment income.
Corporate tax rates, on the other hand, do not vary so
widely (and also tend to be flat rather than progressive).
Among the OECD Member countries, the corporate tax
rate in 2006 ranged from 8.5% (Switzerland) to 35%
(United States), but 22 out of the 30 OECD members
had rates in the 25% to 35% range. Thus, for purposes of
the single tax principle, the rate applied is generally the
residence rate for individual (mostly investment)
income and a rate in the 25% to 35% range for corporate
(mostly business) income. It is congruent with both the
single tax and benefits principles, however, to have residual taxation by residence or source jurisdictions in cases
where the jurisdiction that has the primary right to tax
under the benefits principle refrains from doing so.
Thus, according to the single tax and benefits principles,
all income from cross-border transactions under the
current rate structures should be taxed at a rate between
approximately 25% (the lower end of the source rates)
and approximately 55% (the higher end of the residence
rates).
Neither the single tax principle nor the benefits principle
provides a clear answer to the question of how to divide
the corporate income tax base among the various jurisdictions providing benefits. Market prices can provide
an answer when transactions are at arm’s length, but not
when they are between related parties (and there are no
comparable arm’s length transactions). In addition, the
single tax principle requires that tax be imposed even on
income derived from a jurisdiction that chooses not to
levy a tax in return for the benefits it provides. These
issues are addressed further below.
It is useful to summarize the resulting structure of international taxation in Table 1, which divides the world into
two categories of taxpayers, resident and non-resident.
For each category, there is a further division between
active (business) and passive (investment) income.
Active income is taxed primarily at source, while passive
income is taxed primarily at residence.
Table 1: Structure of the international tax regime
WORLD
Residents

Non-residents

active
income

passive
income

active
income

passive
income

low tax

high tax

high tax

low tax

5. Current Challenges to the International Tax
Regime
Parts 2 to 4 laid out the thesis that an international tax
regime exists and that it has a coherent structure based
on two principles, the single tax principle and the bene14. Id.
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fits principle. While the benefits principle is broadly
accepted as reflecting the consensus compromise
reached under the auspices of the League of Nations in
the 1920s,15 there is a debate on whether an international
tax regime exists16 and, in particular, whether it incorporates the single tax principle.17 Whether preventing double non-taxation is an appropriate goal of international
tax has been hotly debated, e.g. at the 2004 Vienna Congress of the International Fiscal Association.
In this concluding part, I survey three relatively recent
developments that undermine the single tax principle:
tax competition for passive income, tax competition for
active income, and tax arbitrage. I then discuss various
reactions to these developments at both the national and
supranational levels (primarily through the OECD) and
assess their success in curbing the threat to the single tax
principle. Finally, I discuss the implications of these
reactions for the debate surrounding the existence of the
international tax regime. In my opinion, these reactions
prove that an increasing number of important tax
administrations as well as the OECD believe in the single tax principle and seek to implement it in practice.
5.1. Tax competition for passive investment
Since the United States unilaterally abolished withholding on portfolio interest in 1984, there has been a distinct trend not to tax interest at source, which has spread
to other forms of passive income such as capital gains,
royalties, rents, and even dividends. I have explained
elsewhere18 why a combination of officially sanctioned
loopholes (such as the portfolio interest exemption),
source rules (such as the rules for capital gains and for
payments under derivative financial instruments), and
treaty reductions have led the United States not to apply
its withholding tax to almost all forms of passive investment income that economically derives from the US
market.
The lack of a withholding tax combined with the existence of tax havens makes it almost impossible for residence countries to effectively tax passive income. In the
absence of a withholding tax, source countries have no
interest in collecting information on payments of passive income to non-residents. Tax havens have bank
secrecy laws, and payments can be made to them from a
source country without any information being collected
that can be exchanged with the residence country under
the exchange of information article of the applicable
treaty (Art. 26 of the OECD Model).
The result is widespread double non-taxation of investment income: no withholding at source and no effective
residence taxation because of no effective exchange of
information. It is hard to estimate how much tax is
evaded in this way, but Vito Tanzi has estimated that as
much as USD 7 trillion in interest income escape taxation.19 For the US, the annual revenue loss due to this
type of evasion has been estimated to be USD 50 billion.20
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Since 1998, however, residence countries have taken a
series of steps to combat this phenomenon. This is
reflected in the steps taken by the OECD and the EU and
by national tax administrations. The OECD addressed
the problem of tax havens in its 1998 report on harmful
tax competition and has exerted significant pressure on
tax havens to allow effective exchange of information. It
has also adopted a new, much stronger version of Art. 26
of the OECD Model and has drafted a multilateral
exchange of information treaty. The EU has adopted the
Savings Directive, which requires the Member States to
cooperate in ensuring that payments of interest and
other forms of passive income from one Member State
to another are subject to either withholding or information reporting. And national tax administrations have
concluded exchange of information agreements with an
expanding number of tax havens. The US has such
agreements, for example, with most of the Caribbean
jurisdictions listed as tax havens by the OECD. The US is
also cooperating in exchanging information with the EU
by forcing financial institutions to collect information
on payments to the EU that are covered by the portfolio
interest exemption. Even Switzerland has agreed to
cooperate and relax its strict bank secrecy laws.
I have expressed some doubts about whether these initiatives are working. In particular, the actual agreements
reached with tax havens tend to fall short of the
expanded version of Art. 26 envisaged by the OECD. We
still lack universal tax ID numbers to help tax administrations use the information that they get. And even one
non-cooperating tax haven can defeat the whole effort if
payments can be routed through it. This is why I still
believe that a better solution is a coordinated withholding tax imposed by the OECD countries (the US, the EU
Member States and Japan) which is refundable upon a
showing that the income has been declared to the residence country. After all, nobody can afford to leave his
funds in tax havens; they must be invested in the OECD
countries to earn a decent rate of return.
The key point here, however, is not whether the effort is
succeeding, but that it is made. In my opinion, it is clear
that, in the view of all 30 OECD countries (as well as all
the EU Member States, which largely overlap with the
OECD), the single tax principle is valid, and double nontaxation of passive income is not acceptable. Otherwise,
they would not have reacted to the collapse of sourcebased taxation of such income after 1984 by trying so

15. See Ault, Hugh J., “Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division
of the International Tax Base: Principles and Practices”, 47 Tax Law Review 565
(1992); and Graetz and O’Hear, supra note 13.
16. See Rosenbloom, “International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax
System’”, and Rosenbloom, “Cross-Border Arbitrage: The Good, The Bad and
The Ugly”, both supra note 1.
17. See Rosenbloom, “Cross-Border Arbitrage: The Good, The Bad and The
Ugly”, supra note 1.
18. See Avi-Yonah (1996), supra note 3.
19. Tanzi, Vito, Taxation in an Integrating World (1995).
20. Guttentag, Joseph and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Closing the International
Tax Gap”, in Sawicky, Max B. (ed.), Bridging the Tax Gap: Addressing the Crisis in
Federal Tax Administration (2005).
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hard to tax it on a residence basis (where, in accordance
with the benefits principle, it should be taxed).
5.2. Tax competition for active investment
As I have explained at length elsewhere,21 tax competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) has been growing steadily since about 1980 and now means that multinationals can hope to escape any tax on their
cross-border income. Suppose a multinational enterprise (MNE) is resident in country A, has its production
facilities in country B, and sells its products in country
C. Country C can only tax the MNE if it has a permanent
establishment therein and, in the age of electronic commerce, that may be possible to avoid. Country B typically
does not tax the MNE because it is a “production tax
haven,” i.e. a country that refrains from taxing production activities by MNEs while imposing a general corporate tax on domestic corporations. Country A also typically would not tax the resident MNE on a current basis
because it is afraid of MNE headquarters migrating to
other countries (either by inversion-type transactions or
by a takeover by foreign MNEs) and of new MNEs being
incorporated elsewhere. As a result, an MNE like Intel
ends up paying no tax at all on its foreign-source income
(and, if it can deduct stock options, also on its US-source
income).
The economic data show that this type of tax competition exists, although it tends to affect more the corporate
tax revenues in developing countries (country B in the
example) than in developed countries (countries A and
C).22 The reason is that the OECD countries have been
reducing the permanent establishment threshold23 and
that it turns out that, for most MNEs, it is difficult to
avoid having a permanent establishment even in the age
of e-commerce.24

is no taxation at source). I believe this trend will continue until effective residence-based taxation by the
OECD members stops developing countries from
engaging in harmful tax competition.
5.3. Tax arbitrage
Tax arbitrage can be defined as transactions that are
designed to take advantage of differences between
national tax systems to achieve double non-taxation.
Thus, tax arbitrage directly negates the single tax principle.
There is no question that Rosenbloom is correct in his
assertion that countries did not always care about tax
arbitrage. The first US tax treaty was with France in
1937, when France was purely territorial, so the US
reduced its tax at source in the knowledge that the
income would not be taxed at residence.
But I believe that developments since 1984 show that the
US as well as the other OECD Member countries have
reached a consensus that rejects tax arbitrage. In 1984,
the US terminated its treaty with the Netherlands
Antilles on the ground that the US should not have
treaties with countries that do not tax on a residence
basis. Since then, it has been clear that the US will not
enter into treaties with tax havens and that the US views
reductions in source-based taxation as premised upon
the income being taxed by the residence state. This is
why, since 1986, the US has insisted on limitation on
benefits rules in all its tax treaties, which are designed to
prevent reductions in source-based taxation benefiting
non-treaty country residents precisely because such
non-treaty residents may not be taxable on a residence
basis. Domestically, these rules have been bolstered by
court cases and by regulations against the use of conduits to achieve treaty benefits. It has also been adopted
by the OECD through changes to the Commentary on
Art. 1 of the OECD Model.

In this case, however, the OECD has also been working
hard to combat the tax competition phenomenon by
putting pressure on both OECD members and nonmembers to abolish production tax havens as well as to
abandon tax sparing rules in treaties that foster double
non-taxation. In addition, the WTO has been pressuring
developing countries to abandon production tax havens
that amount to export subsidies, and many Latin American countries have in fact abandoned their production
tax haven regimes in the Doha Round. Finally, countries
have been taking steps to defend the residence-based
taxation of their MNEs by adopting or strengthening
their CFC rules (26 countries now have such rules,
which were pioneered by the US in 1962) and combating
inversion transactions (e.g. IRC Sec. 7874).

The negative attitude of the US to tax arbitrage and double non-taxation is also evident outside the treaty context. Also in 1984, the US adopted the dual consolidated
loss rule, which is designed to prevent a taxpayer from
using one economic loss in two taxing jurisdictions. As
Rosenbloom admitted,25 this rule (which was recently
expanded in the US regulations) makes no sense unless
the US believes that double non-taxation is bad. In the
1990s, the US took a series of steps to combat specific tax
arbitrage transactions based on “check the box”, such as

Again, the main point is not whether these efforts have
been successful, although at least for the OECD members they seem to have stopped the erosion of the corporate tax base that was evident in the 1990s. The main
point is that, by adopting such measures, the OECD
members (as well as the WTO) show that they do not
accept the double non-taxation of active income and are
trying to protect the taxation of such income at source
(with residual taxation by the residence country if there

21. Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State”, supra note 3.
22. Keen, Michael and Alejandro Simone, “Is Tax Competition Harming
Developing Countries More Than Developed”, 34 Tax Notes International
1317 (2004).
23. Le Gall, Jean-Pierre, “Can a Subsidiary be the Permanent Establishment
of Its Foreign Parent”, 2006 Tillinghast Lecture, New York University Law
School (forthcoming in Tax Law Review, 2007).
24. Avi-Yonah, supra note 11; Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “Tax Competition and
E-Commerce”, 23 Tax Notes International 1395 (2001).
25. Rosenbloom, “International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax
System’”, supra note 1.
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IRC Sec. 894(c) (the reverse hybrid rule) and Notices 985 and 98-11. While the specific notices were later withdrawn, the Bush administration continues to fight tax
arbitrage, as evidenced by recent regulations on tax arbitrage transactions involving the foreign tax credit.26
The same negative view toward tax arbitrage can be seen
in other countries. A 2006 article in the International
Tax Review lists the new anti-tax arbitrage rules that
were recently adopted in Australia, Canada, Japan and
the UK; and even Ireland (with a corporate tax rate of
only 12.5%) adopted such rules in 2006. The UK rules
are particularly comprehensive and have drawn bitter
complaints from tax practitioners, to no avail.
In 2006, Rosenbloom wrote that, although an international tax regime may exist and although tax treaties can
be regarded as a “closed” system which conditions reductions in source taxation on taxation by the residence
country, the single tax principle is still a mirage: “At the
level of specific rules, however, there is no mechanism
for enforcing, or even attempting to enforce, either the
benefits principle or the single tax principle .... At the
level of individual transactions, in fact, it is hard to discern the existence of any international tax regime at
all.”27
Rosenbloom may be right about that – as a practitioner
specializing in tax arbitrage transactions, he should
know. But at the policy level, I disagree with his view that
“an effort to foreclose cross-border arbitrage opportunities is not and should not be a first-rank policy objective
of the United States”. We can argue about the “should not”,
and that is the point of our earlier debate on this topic.28

But in face of the accumulating evidence to the contrary,
it seems to me hard to argue about the “is not”: the US as
well as the other OECD Member countries are in fact
concerned about tax arbitrage and, by extension, about
double non-taxation, both in the treaty context and outside it.
6. Conclusion
This article has attempted to describe the contours
of the international tax regime. I have tried to show
that such a regime exists and that it is based on the
single tax and benefits principles. Moreover,
I believe the regime, both through treaties and
through actual practice, can be regarded as part of
customary international law. Whether or not the
last conclusion is valid, it is hard to argue with the
proposition that all countries, even the United
States, face significant practical difficulties in
attempting to depart from the international tax
regime.
If the above is true, I believe that we can do better.
In particular, it would help if countries explicitly
articulated that they are trying to adhere to the
single tax and benefits principle and take those
principles into account in drafting their tax laws.
Moreover, the OECD should take these principles
more explicitly into consideration in revising the
OECD Model and revise it so that it functions
better to prevent both double taxation and double
non-taxation. But that is a topic for another day.29

26. Reich, Yaron Z., “International Arbitrage Transactions Involving Creditable Taxes” (forthcoming in Taxes (University of Chicago publication),
2006); Peaslee, James M., Creditable Taxes as an Expense in Applying the Economic Profit Test – Here We Go Again? (2006).
27. Rosenbloom, “Cross-Border Arbitrage: The Good, The Bad and The
Ugly”, supra note 1.
28. Rosenbloom, “International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax
System’”, supra note 1; Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the
Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State”, supra note 3.
29. Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., Wolfgang Schön and Richard Vann, The Treatment of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (forthcoming).
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